During the s to s, the Islamist movements in Southeast Asia still regarded the United States as an important ally in the struggle against communism, an ideology they regarded as fundamentally un-Islamic. In Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, marked a turning point in local politics as student movements in these countries rose in protest against their own governments and what they regarded as their Western backers.
By then Japan was seen as yet another pro-Western country bent on exerting its will and economic clout against a defenseless Southeast Asia, and the condemnations of both Japan and the united States were uttered in the same breath. In the case of the countries of Southeast Asia, this occurred as a result of the anti-communist struggle, which in turn eliminated a number of other democratic alternatives along the way.
The second factor that contributed to the emergence of Islamism as a counter-hegemonic force in these societies is the process of globalization, which hastened the rush towards a global market and the dismantling of the older institutions of the state in the developing South. Developments in communications technology also brought the Muslim world closer together, and helped Islamist opposition groups in Southeast Asia interact with one another while keeping abreast of developments in other parts of the Muslim world.
Supportive of the global trend of Islamic resurgence in the s, ABIM then became the biggest supporter of the Islamic revolution in Iran. At the same time, developments in Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Algeria and other countries demonstrated that the post-colonial elite in these Muslim states were unable to carry out their developmental projects to the end, as many post-colonial leaders instead succumbed to the temptation of living in now-vacant colonial palaces.
There seemed no hope of finding a cure within the system, so those who were disillusioned merely looked beyond the frontier of the state. The battle for the future of Islam was fought between secular elites and the newly emerging defenders of political Islam who combined the discursive tools of Islamist ideology with the instruments of modern communication, mass mobilization, networking, and political organization.
It is no coincidence that the current wave of global Islamism has been most visible in Muslim states with the highest urbanization rate.
They set up alternative education networks, communication and logistical infrastructures, and local organic linkages, as well as propagating their own brand of often conservative and oppositional Islamic politics. This was meant to serve as a corrective measure against what they regarded as the imposition of secular, liberal and Westernized ideas and values by their own Westernized elites and governments. In Indonesia the depoliticization process had forced the Islamists to go underground and alter their tactics, opting for a culturalist approach to Islamization that sought to Islamize Indonesian society rather than its political institutions.
This necessarily included the Malaysian government as well. On October 8, , the same day that American forces began their invasion of Afghanistan, the leaders of PAS mobilized their members for the biggest demonstration of Islamists in the streets of Kuala Lumpur. Osama bin Laden is just an excuse for the u.
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But by , Indonesia was also caught in dire straits of its own. Realpolitik considerations aside, the Islamist parties and movements in Indonesia were less pragmatic in their approach to the problem. The Philippines was likewise forced to deal with a backlash from Islamists in the troubled province of Mindanao in the south. Soon after the American response was made known to the international community, the Abu Sayyaf group renewed its attacks on Filipino government installations and outposts all over the province, and a new wave of hostage taking was soon underway.
For the countries in Asia with sizeable Muslim minorities, it reopened old wounds after decades of internal civil conflict, and served as a justification for clamping down on local Muslim resistance movements. The resurgence of violence in Southern Thailand from to —which received relatively less media coverage from the Western media compared to the problems in Darfur Sudan , Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq—confirmed the suspicion held by many Southeast Asian Muslims that Western double-standards were again at work and that the lives of Muslim were worth much less than that of non-Muslims.
While flags and effigies of American leaders were set on fire, the leaders of Islamist movements like PAS reiterated their calls for Muslim unity against the united States, which has by now been defined as the primary threat to the Muslim world and the enemy of islam. Rightly or wrongly, America is seen and presented by the Islamists of the region as the true inheritor of neocolonialism in ASEAN today. From to , the United States paid little attention to the evolution of political Islam in both Malaysia and Indonesia, preferring to work almost exclusively with the governments of both countries.
It was only in the wake of September 11, that Washington began to demonstrate a keen interest in the development of political Islam in Indonesia. Thanks in part to their role in exacerbating the economic inequalities and deficiencies in the developing world, successive American governments have helped create the socio-cultural, political and economic circumstances that favor the rise of radical groupings in search of a change and a new socio-political order.
In the predominantly poor Muslim-dominated countryside and urban ghettos of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, it is a different story altogether. Eade, J. Mele London: Blackwell, A Fundamental Fear, Though it should be noted that despite the threats issued by the leaders of the Malaysian Islamic party, not a single member of PAS actually traveled to Iraq to take part in the Gulf War.
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Changing perceptions of the United States among the Muslim communities of southeast Asia
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Central European University Press. But while Barak signaled a willingness to be very flexible on Syrian needs, Hafez al-Assad had other concerns. The next and last time Clinton met Assad was in March of in Geneva, gifting him a tie and a generous Israeli compromise, namely offering more Israeli concessions on the Golan Heights. But Assad cut off the lame duck mid-presentation, taking a hardline stance that contradicted his earlier positions. In May, Barak — realizing there was no hope for peace with Syria — delivered on his campaign promise and abruptly ordered the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon.
It now lacked any leverage over Israel to pressure it to return the Golan Heights, and thus prodded the puppet government of Selim al-Hoss in Beirut to proclaim the Shebaa Farms as Lebanese and that the Israeli occupation had therefore not ended.
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Assad was soon replaced by his inexperienced son, Bashar, who treated Hezbollah and Iran as equals. Syria had yet to cede its sovereignty to Iran or Hezbollah in the s, as it would effectively do after the onset of the Syrian Civil War in In fact, Damascus held the upper hand in both relationships at the time, and Assad refused to even treat Tehran or its Lebanon-based proxy as equal partners. They were subordinate tactical allies, and failing to pressure Syria back then to disarm Hezbollah cost America a historical opportunity that was perhaps permanently lost after Though at the time Hezbollah did not rank high on the list of perceived threats to the homeland, Hezbollah was building alliances with al-Qaeda and other terror groups and attempting to undercut America and its interests.
To its credit, the Clinton administration was the first to begin sanctioning the group. The first measure came on January 25, These were positive moves, indicating an increasing awareness of the threat posed by Hezbollah. However, they were not part of a comprehensive American strategy to combat Hezbollah, and therefore insufficient and mostly symbolic, having overall little effect on the group or its ability to undercut American regional policies.https://compnolborgslacapex.ga
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The September 11, attacks defined the Bush presidency more than any other event. It renewed interest in Hezbollah, and created an environment where America could begin to work in concert with other nations against Hezbollah, in contrast to the previous decade. Defining the group as a terror organization was once again up for discussion in the international arena. Internationalizing the fight against Hezbollah was just one of many lost opportunities to curtail the group during this decade. In fact, it seems that only after the War on Terror was declared did America begin to grasp the magnitude of the threat from Hezbollah and its global terrorist reach, as indicated by a State Department report.
Eventually, after much debate within the administration, Hezbollah was added to the list on November 2, , over the objection of leading officials, including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
In , Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte testified before the Senate Intelligence committee that Hezbollah was capable of attacking American interests to protect Iran. America had been hunting the elusive Mughniyeh for decades. The CIA, in fact, mistakenly thought they had tracked him down in Paris in On April 7, , they again suffered a near miss.
After learning he was aboard a Middle East Airlines flight from Khartoum to Beirut that would transit through Riyadh, they asked the Saudis to detain him. However, fearing a backlash, an unknown Saudi official ordered air traffic control to wave off the plane, and Mughniyeh escaped again.
Hezbollah, whose chain of command is such that no single person is solely responsible for important decisions, quickly rebounded and transformed Mughniyeh into a martyr. With 15 years of hindsight, the Iraq war can be described as a mixed bag at best. However, America possessed a perhaps unintended advantage at the outset of the invasion. Both Hezbollah and these two sponsors had good reason for concern, since the Bush administration had dubbed them as state sponsors of terrorism. Hezbollah understandably felt threatened in those early days, and wanted to step out of American crosshairs.
In the period leading up to the American invasion of Iraq, Hezbollah may have raised its rhetoric, but meanwhile its behavior became more circumspect, and it restrained even its provocations against Israel. This lack of pressure allowed Hezbollah time to regroup and implement its plan to sink America into the Iraqi quagmire through raising and training of Shiite militias that bedevil American forces to this day.